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INSURANCE LAW-The Court Rules on Underinsured
Motorist Coverage; Keep It in the Family: Mountain
States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martinez
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martinez, I the New Mexico
Supreme Court enforced an insurance policy provision which offset underinsured motorist (UM) benefits by the amount of all payments made
under the liability portion of the policy. 2 In so doing, the court looked
to the law of contract as well as to any overriding public policy considerations which might render the contract provision unenforceable. 3 The
case involved the claim of a passenger injured in an auto accident caused
by the host driver. 4 Noting that a similar provision is unenforceable when
the claimant is a relative living in the household of the car's owner, the
court declined to rule similarly when the claimant was merely a friend.,
The court's justification for the disparate treatment of essentially similar
insurance claimants fades under the light of closer scrutiny. This Note
examines the jurisprudence of UM insurance and analyzes the court's
decision in Martinez, which represents a departure from the direction the
court took in a case decided just three years earlier. 6
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 15, 1988, Jacqueline Martinez rode as a passenger in a car
driven by her friend, Jennifer Roybal, over a stretch of Interstate 25 in
San Miguel County, New Mexico. 7 Roybal rear-ended a commercial truck,
causing severe injuries to Martinez. Martinez' short-term medical expenses
exceeded $17,000, and future medical expenses brought her total damages
to over $135,000.
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company insured Roybal under a
policy issued to her father. The policy covered any Roybal family member
against liability for up to $60,000 per accident. The policy also provided
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for up to $60,000. 8 The annual prem-

1. 115 N.M. 141, 848 P.2d 527 (1993), reh'g denied.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 142, 848 P.2d at 528.
4. Id. at 141, 848 P.2d at 527.

5. Id. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529.
6. See Padilla v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 109 N.M. 555, 787 P.2d 835 (1990).
7. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 141, 848 P.2d at 27; see also Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 6, Martinez,
115 N.M. 141, 848 P.2d 527 (CV-91 04391) (providing details omitted from court's opinion).

8. The policy defined an uninsured motor vehicle as a vehicle:
(a) For which no liability bond or policy at the time of an accident provides at
least the amounts required by the applicable law where a covered auto is principally
garaged, or
(b) For which the sum of all liability bonds or policies at the time of an accident
provides at least the amounts required by the applicable law where a covered auto
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iums for those coverages on the automobile involved in the accident were
$98.00 and $16.00, respectively. 9 The large difference in cost reflects the
difference in the insurer's calculated risks associated with liability coverage
and UM coverage.
After settlement negotiations, Mountain States paid Martinez $58,712.94
and paid the truck owner $1,287.06, thus reaching the policy's liability
limit for a single accident. Martinez claimed her damages exceeded what
she received under Roybal's liability coverage and that she was entitled
to additional compensation from Roybal's UM coverage. Martinez calculated that Mountain States still owed her $33,333.33, using a pro rata
formula that accounted for other UM coverage available to Martinez
under other policies to which she was a named insured or covered as a
family member.
Mountain States filed a complaint in the District Court of Bernalillo
County seeking declaratory judgment to enforce exclusionary language
in the UM portion of the policy which read:
2. Any amount payable under this insurance shall be reduced by ...
(b) All sums paid by or for anyone who is legally responsible, including
all sums paid under the policy's LIABILITY INSURANCE.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer and the New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. 0
III.

HISTORY OF THE ISSUE

The resolution of cases involving insurance claims normally stems from
the application of contract law and interpretation of the provisions within
the relevant insurance policies." However, in some instances, the court
override certain contract promay find that public policy considerations
2
visions and render them unenforceable.
As Justice Frost stated in his opinion, the court faced the issue of
first impression of "whether a guest passenger should be allowed to
recover for public policy reasons under both the liability and underinsured
motorist provisions of a negligent host driver's insurance policy, even
though a provision in the policy would prevent the double recovery."' 3
Chief Justice Ransom, in his special concurrence on the denied motion

is principally garaged but their limits are less than the limit of this insurance....
Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A at 4, Martinez, 115 N.M. 141, 848 P.2d 527. This definition
incorporates what is commonly understood as uninsured motorist coverage as well as underinsured
motorist coverage. The distinctions between the two are not significant to this discussion because
the law treats them in a similar fashion as far as victims of auto accidents are concerned.
9. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A at 1, Martinez, 115 N.M. 141, 848 P.2d 527.
10. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 141, 848 P.2d at 527.
II. Id. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529.
12. See Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 216, 218, 704 P.2d 1092, 1094
(1985) (holding invalid policy provisions that limit recovery of UM benefits to only the coverage
purchased under the accident vehicle).
13. Martinez, i15 N.M. at 141, 848 P.2d at 527.
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for a rehearing explained why the case presented more than the occasion
to consider "policy language" that effects a rule articulated in an earlier
case,' 4 but the majority opinion did precisely that.15 Coming on the heels
of a recent decision, Padilla v. DairylandInsurance Co.,16 the court in
Martinez used the occasion for another examination of the public policy
underlying the statute.
UM coverage usually compensates victims injured by a driver of a
second automobile who either does not have liability coverage as required
by law or whose coverage is not enough to fully compensate the victim
for the loss.' 7 However, Martinez involved two victims whose injuries
were caused by the driver of the vehicle in which she rode and whose
damages exceeded the liability limits of the vehicle owner's insurance
policy. In such a situation, the injured party recovers under the liability
portion of the vehicle owner's policy, but because the liability coverage
of that policy is insufficient to cover the total damages, the victim seeks
to recover additional compensation under the UM portion of the same
policy.
A.

Contract Principles
Because insurance cases normally use the contract between the parties
as the starting point, the customary provisions found in common automobile policies provide a backdrop for discussion. Automobile insurance
policies cover two classes of persons. Class I insureds include the person
in whose name the policy was issued as well as any relative living in
the household of the named insured. 8 Class II insureds are those persons
covered by virtue of their occupancy of a vehicle covered under the
policy. '9
The policy issued to Jennifer Roybal's father, Rumaldo Roybal, used
typical language to identify who is covered:

14. Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Company, 103 N.M. 216, 223, 704 P.2d 1092, 1099
(1985) (upholding exclusionary language in an insurance policy which reduced the amount payable
under the UM portion of coverage by any payment made by the tortfeasor). While the New Mexico
UM statute "does not specifically providethat the insured's underinsured motorist liability insurance
is to be offset by the tortfeasor's liability coverage ... , such an offset is inherent in [New Mexico's]
statutory definition of underinsured motorist." Id.
15. As Chief Justice Ransom noted, the case presented the issue of whether the liability payment
to Jacqueline Martinez under the Mountain States policy would have reduced any UM benefits she
might have received under her own policies. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 144, 848 P.2d at 530 (Ransom,
C.J., concurring). This issue was not raised by the parties and therefore not decided, id., but it
could have drastically affected the total amount she might have ultimately recovered, regardless of
whether she could have recovered UM benefits under the Mountain States policy.
16. 109 N.M. 555, 560, 787 P.2d 835, 840 (1990) (holding that the uninsured/underinsured
motorist coverage on a vehicle owned by the named insured entitles an insured family member to
recover for an accident involving the insured vehicle, even though the insurance policy attempts to
exclude UM coverage for any vehicle owned by the named insured). Accord Tissell v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 795 P.2d 126, 129 (Wash. 1990); but see Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tank, 703
P.2d 580, 582 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
17. Breaux v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 369 So. 2d 1335, 1338 (La. 1979) (interpreting
uninsured motorist statute essentially the same as New Mexico's).
18. Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 112, 115, 703 P.2d 889, 892 (1985).
19. Id.
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WHO IS INSURED

1. You or any family member.
2. Anyone else occupying a covered auto or a temporary substitute
for a covered auto.20
This standard language made Jacqueline Martinez a Class II insured under
the Roybal policy.
The distinction between Class I and Class II insureds is crucial in the
determination of their respective rights, particularly regarding UM coverage. 2 1 Using the principles of contract law, the New Mexico Supreme
Court has used this distinction in analyzing automobile insurance claims
while simultaneously interpreting the public policy expressed in the state's
22
UM statute.
The parties to an insurance contract bargain for their rights and
obligations, and any ambiguities are normally resolved in favor of coverage. 23 Since named insureds are parties to the contract, their reasonable
expectations of precisely what coverage they bargained for can be determined by examining the breakdown of the overall premium which they
paid. 24 Referring to the Roybal policy, Class I insureds are covered without
the condition that they be occupying a covered auto at the time of the
accident; their coverage follows them regardless of the circumstances of
the accident .25 But automobile insurance policies typically charge a separate
premium for each type of coverage on each vehicle insured under that
policy. Therefore, with each additional vehicle covered under the policy
and for which a separate premium has been paid for UM coverage, a
named insured has essentially purchased additional coverage for each
Class I insured.2 6 The result is that Class I insureds have the right to
UM coverages listed under the various covered vehicles
stack the individual
27
in the policy.
On the other hand, Class II insureds are not parties to the contract
and are insured only because they happen to occupy a covered vehicle
at the time of the accident; they may not stack UM coverages because
the purchaser "would not expect the occupant to recover under any
additional policies that the purchaser obtained." 2 The partial premium

20. Plaintiff's Complaint, Exhibit A at 5.
21. Konnick, 108 N.M. at 115, 703 P.2d at 892.
22. Id. Insurance carriers are required, absent the insured's written waiver, to supplement any
liability coverage with UM coverage with minimum limits equal to that of the statutory minimum
for liability coverage and maximum limits equal to the liability coverage actually purchased in the
same policy. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-5-215 to -301 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). An underinsured motorist
is "an operator of a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which
the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability insurance applicable at the time
of the accident is less than the limits of liability under the insured's uninsured motorist coverage."
Id.
23. See Home v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 109 N.M. 786, 787, 791 P.2d 61, 62

(1990).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Konnick, 103 N.M.
Martinez, 115 N.M. at
Morro v. Farmers Ins.
Id.
Konnick, 108 N.M. at

at 116, 703 P.2d at 893.
143, 848 P.2d 529.
Group, 106 N.M. 669, 671, 748 P.2d 512, 514 (1988).
115, 703 P.2d at 892.
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paid specifically for coverage of the accident vehicle is the only payment
which provides an avenue for recovery for a Class II insured; therefore,
the parties to the contract-both the insurer and the named insuredwould not reasonably expect coverages listed under vehicles other than
the accident vehicle to apply to Class II insureds.2 9
B.

Public Policy
In addition to the principles of contract, a court must also examine
insurance policies in light of the public policy behind the UM statute.
In passing the UM statute, the New Mexico Legislature intended for
insurers to offer additional coverage to persons purchasing liability insurance in order to compensate those injured through no fault of their
own.3 0 An injured insured should be put "in the same position he would
have been in had the tortfeasor had liability coverage in an amount equal
motorist protection purchased for the into the uninsured/underinsured
3
sured's benefit." '
C.

Calculation of Benefits
Generally, UM benefits are calculated with reference either to total
damages or to the aggregate of uninsured motorist coverage purchased
for the insured's benefit. If the tortfeasor's liability payment insufficiently
compensates the victim, the maximum benefits under both liability and
UM coverage are figured either by adding the UM coverage policy limits
to the total liability benefits (total damages), or by adding up only the
UM coverage policy limits available to the victim (aggregate UM coverage
approach). The following table illustrates the two approaches to computing
benefits involving UM coverage:
Method

Total Dmgs.

UM Limit

Liability Pmt.

UM Benefit

Total Damages

$100,000

$80,000

$60,000

$40,000

Aggregate of
UM Coverage

$100,000

$80,000

$60,000

$20,000

The aggregate UM coverage approach effectively caps the total recovery
at the sum of the UM coverages in all policies under which the claimant
is insured. The language used in the New Mexico UM statute provides
for the aggregate approach. 2 If the tortfeasor makes no compensation
whatsoever, the two approaches reach the same result.

29. Id.
30. See generally Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 216, 219, 704 P.2d
1092, 1095 (1985).
31. Id.
32. Schmick, 103 N.M. at 218, 704 P.2d at 1094.
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Sometimes the victim may have UM coverage from more than one
policy and from more than one insurer. Additionally, those coverages
may be a mixture of Class I and Class II coverages. In such cases, the
Class II insurer must pay up to the policy limits before the Class I
insurer is required to pay. 3 Within each class of coverages, the liability
on a pro-rata basis to determine how
payment is credited to each policy
34
much each insurer shall pay.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Martinez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that public policy
does not prohibit an insurance policy provision which prevents double
recovery by a Class II insured by offsetting UM benefits with liability
benefits. 35 The court adopted the rationale of the Arizona and Hawaii36
Supreme Courts which reached the same conclusion in similar cases.
Those courts considered such double recovery a form of stacking which
has the effect of "increas[ing] the liability coverage purchased by the
named insured."

' 37

The Martinez court also found support for its conclusion in an oftquoted Washington case:
The owner of a vehicle purchases liability insurance to, among other
things, protect passengers in the vehicle from his, or another driver's,
negligent driving. He purchases underinsured motorist coverage to
protect himself and others from damages caused by another vehicle
which is underinsured. An insured wishing to avoid personal liability,
and protect his passengers, may simply increase the liability insurance.

33. "The policy covering the vehicle involved in the accident is closer to the risk than the policy
insuring the non-owner driver or passenger." Tarango v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 115 N.M. 225,
226, 849 P.2d 368, 369 (1993) (quoting Branchal v. Safeco Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 70, 738 P.2d 1315
(1987)). The Tarango court also reasoned that a pro-ration between the Class I and Class II insurers
would require the Class I insurer to pay an amount according to the relative policy limits even
though its insured vehicle was not involved in the collision. Tarango, 115 N.M. at 227, 879 P.2d
at 370. The court based the foregoing on the distinction between the insured vehicle and the insured
person, but it did not explain why that should make a difference in how the financial responsibility
should be distributed.
34. Morro v. Farmers Ins. Group, 106 N.M. 669, 672, 748 P.2d 512, 515 (1988). However,
when UM coverages are prorated, the division should be based on the number of insurers rather
than the number of policies. Each insurer has contracted to assume the risk and any difference
between the policy limits with respect to each insurer should have no bearing on their contractual
obligations. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the accident occurs in the victim's own vehicle or
while the victim rode as a passenger in someone else's. The familiar Class I and Class II distinctions
merge in such cases since the expectations of the parties to the contracts are identical once the
stacking calculation has been completed.
35. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 141, 848 P.2d at 527.
36. See Duran v. Hartford Ins. Co., 772 P.2d 577, 578 (Ariz. 1989); Kang v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 815 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Haw. 1991). The Martinez court considered the Arizona and
Hawaii statutory provisions "substantially identical" to those of New Mexico. Martinez, 115 N.M.
at 142, 848 P.2d at 528. The Arizona and Hawaii statutes differ slightly in that they use the "total
damages" approach in determining the underinsured status of a tortfeasor. Duran, 772 P.2d at
577; Kang, 815 P.2d at 1022, while the New Mexico statute uses the "aggregate UM benefits"
approach. Schmick, 103 N.M. at 218, 704 P.2d at 1094.
37. Duran, 772 P.2d at 578 (quoting ALAN I. WuIss, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTOUST
INSURAN cE § 40.2, at 79 (2d ed. 1987)); see Kang, 815 P.2d at 1022.
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The result of dual recovery in the instant case would transform
underinsured motorist coverage into liability insurance. This result
would cause insurance companies to charge substantially more for
underinsured motorist coverage in order to match the cost of that
coverage with the presently more expensive liability coverage. This
increase in cost would discourage consumers from purchasing underinsured coverage, an important protection presently available for a
minimal cost. Further, passengers can obtain underinsured coverage
from their own insurers. s
Thus, the Martinez court concluded that "when there are no overriding
public policy consideration to the contrary, the obligations of an insurer
on an underinsured motorist policy are determined by applying principles
of contract law."3 9 The court determined that the Mountain States policy
provisions effectively barred a Class II claimant from recovery of both
liability and UM benefits.
In Padilla v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 40 however, the court struck a
provision that would have barred a Class I insured from a similar double
recovery on the grounds that the contract as written would violate the
public policy behind the statute: compensation of victims injured through
no fault of their own. Implicitly, such a policy endeavors to more evenly
distribute the burdens of motor vehicle accidents, instead of having
innocent victims absorbing an unjust share of the cost.
The Martinez court distinguished the policy behind Padilla from the
policy behind Briggs on the grounds that it involved a Class I claimant
while the plaintiff in Briggs was a Class II claimant. 4' This distinction
between insureds, however, was developed to treat their differences in
cases involving the stacking of UM benefits. 42 In those earlier cases, the
court in Martinez recognized that, unlike Class II insureds, Class I insureds
had a viable expectation of multiple recovery based on additional premiums paid for UM coverage on different vehicles.
However, the same principles of contract prevent such a distinction in
the context of a passenger injured by a negligent host driver. In Martinez,
the court focused on the plaintiff's contractual relationship with the
insurance company, 43 but it should have also addressed the named insured's relationship with the insurer. The court reasoned:
Martinez did not pay a premium to Roybal's insurer; thus, she had
no contractual expectation of underinsured coverage on the policy.
Accordingly, Mountain States and Roybal limited Martinez' under-

38. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529 (quoting Millers Casualty Ins. Co. of Texas
v. Briggs, 665 P.2d 891, 895 (Wash. 1983)). Accord Poehls v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d
62, 64 (Iowa 1989); Wolgemuth v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 535 A.2d 1145, 1150 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1988), cert. denied, 551 A.2d 216 (Pa. 1988).
39. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529.
40. 109 N.M. 555, 557, 787 P.2d 835, 837 (1990).
41. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529; see also Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 795
P.2d 126 (Wash. 1990).
42. See generally Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 103 N.M. 112, 703 P.2d 889 (1985).
43. Martinez, 115 N.M. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529.
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insured benefits by contract without interfering in any way with
Martinez' reasonable expectations .... She received compensation in
the form of liability benefits, and she will recover underinsured motorist benefits on policies on which she is a Class I insured."
The court did not explore Rumaldo Roybal's contractual expectations.
Presumably, he purchased UM coverage with the purpose of protecting
anyone riding in his car from injuries caused by uninsured or underinsured
tortfeasors. With a reasonable reading of his policy, he could hardly
have understood the UM coverage portion to treat family members and
friends any differently when they are injured in an accident caused by
the host driver (negligent host accident). To the contrary, a reasonable
reading would lead him to confidently assure his friends (or his daughter's
friends) that they were protected the same as his own family. In the
absence of clear language to the contrary, when the insurer grants benefits
to one class of passengers and denies them to another, the insurer fails
to meet the legitimate expectations of the insured. While Jacqueline
Martinez did not have any contractual relationship with Mountain States,
Rumaldo Roybal did; the inquiry failed to properly consider his contractual interest.
Because the insured's contractual expectations did not make any distinction between Class I and Class II insureds in this context, the Martinez
decision represents an unjustified departure from the established law. The
court had already ruled in Padilla that an exclusion preventing double
recovery of liability and UM benefits violated public policy if a family
member brought the claim.
Tissell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. offers a lengthy discussion of
the two types of cases which the New Mexico court has now faced
(negligent host driver/injured family member and negligent host/injured
friend). 45 The Washington court, like the New Mexico court, allowed for
the double recovery in the case of the injured family member and
distinguished it from the case of the injured friend."6 Basing its decision
on the public policy of full compensation for victims, the Tissell court
said "it is not reasonable to expect that any motorist will buy more than
one UIM policy," and since "such a victim's only source of UIM coverage
is cut off by the liability coverage exclusion in his policy, the exclusion
frustrates the legislature's intent to provide UIM coverage to all potential
victims.'"4'
In Martinez, the court's language echoed that of Tissell." But both
courts assume that any non-related passengers will naturally have their
own automobile insurance from which they may recover UM benefits.
That is not necessarily true; if it is unreasonable to expect a family
member to buy more than one policy in order to guard against an

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
795 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1990).
Id. at 127.
Id.
See Martinez, 115 N.M. at 143, 848 P.2d at 529.
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underinsured negligent host, it is no more reasonable to expect certain
elderly or disabled persons, or simply any person who does not drive,
to purchase such a separate policy.
The court in Tissell also explained that UM insurance acts "as a layer
of excess coverage that 'floats' on the top of recovery from other
sources. " 49 Since the public policy behind the statute is to provide compensation to those injured through no fault of their own, this second
layer of coverage is necessary to achieve the legislature's intent. Contract
provisions purporting to exclude the second layer of coverage frustrate
that purpose regardless of whether or not the victim is a family member.
Finally, both the Washington and New Mexico courts too hastily
adopted the notion that the sort of double recovery which Jacqueline
Martinez sought would "transform underinsurance coverage into liability
insurance" and thereby "cause insurance companies to charge substantially
of
more for underinsured motorist coverage in order to match the cost
50 In
coverage."
liability
that coverage with the presently more expensive
Padilla, the court's judgment might have had that effect, but the court
allowed the double recovery anyway. Realistically, allowing the double
recovery would only slightly increase UM premiums since the additional
exposure to the insurance company arises from those special cases involving injuries to passengers caused by a negligent host driver.
Moreover, the double recovery does not transform UM insurance into
liability insurance; the benefits simply come from the same payor as a
matter of consequence. The principle behind the payment is the same
no matter who cuts the check: the liability benefits available to the
innocent victim do not sufficiently compensate, so the supplemental UM
insurance kicks in.
V.

CONCLUSION

Martinez, heard so soon after Padilla, involves the court's adherence
to distinctions between classes of insureds covered by automobile policies.
While disparate treatment of those classes of insureds is justified in
certain contexts where their reasonable expectations are dissimilar, this
adherence has caused the court to treat those classes differently in situations where their interests and expectations actually coincide.
The court enforced a policy provision effectively excluding recovery
of both liability and UM benefits under the same policy, based on the
court's notion of how the parties did or did not contract. Instead, the
court should have more fully considered the contractual expectations of
the named insured in its analysis; had it done so, it may have decided
differently.
Finally, the court determined that public policy considerations do not
override the policy exclusion since the claimant had UM benefits from

49. Tissell, 795 P.2d at 132 (Callow, C.J., concurring).
50. Martinez, 115 N.M.

at 143, 848 P.2d at 529.
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other sources. Because this situation may not hold true in numerous
other cases, such a pronouncement is more a rationalization than a rule
of law.
FREDERICK KENNON

